Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that guarantees that either fairness is guaranteed or that each honest party obtains a monetary penalty from the adversary. Protocols for this task are typically designed in an hybrid model where parties have access to a "claim-or-refund" transaction functionality denote F * CR . In this work, we obtain improvements on the efficiency of these constructions by amortizing the cost over multiple executions of secure computation with penalties. More precisely, for computational security parameter λ, we design a protocol that implements = poly(λ) instances of secure computation with penalties where the total number of calls to F * CR is independent of .
INTRODUCTION
Protocols for secure multiparty computation [23, 10] allow a set of mutually distrusting parties to carry out a distributed computation without compromising on privacy of inputs or correctness of the end result. Despite being a powerful tool, it is known that secure computation protocols do not provide fairness or guaranteed output delivery when a majority of the parties are dishonest [7] . Addressing this deficiency is critical if secure computation is to be widely adopted in practice, especially given the current interest in practical secure computation. Several workarounds have been proposed in the literature to counter adversaries that may decide to abort, possibly depending on the outcome of the protocol. In this work, we are interested in the workaround proposed in [18, 17] where an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other part that did not receive the output. In practice, such mechanisms would be effective if the compensation amount is rightly defined. While the original works [18, 17] depended on e-cash systems, recent works [4, 2, 6, 14, 1, 15, 12] have shown how to use a decentralized digital curPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CCS '16, October 24 -28, 2016 , Vienna, Austria In this work, we propose major improvements to the efficiency of protocols for secure computation with penalties by amortizing the cost over multiple executions (effectively making the amortized "on-chain" cost zero). To better explain our contributions, we first discuss the model, efficiency metrics, settings, and the efficiency of state-of-the-art protocols.
Claim-or-refund transaction functionality. In [6, 15] , protocols for secure computation with penalties are designed in a hybrid model where parties have access to an ideal transaction functionality called the claim-or-refund transaction functionality [6, 5, 19] . This functionality, denoted as F * CR , takes care of handling "money/coins" and allows protocols to be designed independently of the Bitcoin ecosystem. In a nutshell, F * CR implements the following functionality: (1) it accepts a deposit of coins(q), a Boolean circuit φ and a time-limit τ from a designated sender S; and (2) waits until time τ to get a witness w from a designated receiver R such that φ(w) = 1; and (3) if such a witness was received within time τ transfers coins(q) to R; (4) else returns coins(q) back to S.
Three features of F * CR explain its importance: (1) F * CR can be very efficiently implemented in Bitcoin (see Appendix A), and (2) F tially the circuit φ). While this is expected to improve in the future (and other alt-coins like Ethereum are already offer generous support for scripts), the size of the Boolean circuit does a good job in capturing the complexity of the scripts that Bitcoin needs to support secure computation with penalties. We denote the total size of the Boolean scripts (i.e., Bitcoin scripts) used in our protocols as the "script complexity" of the protocol. Finally, the maximum value of the time-limit used in the sequence of F * CR deposits captures the "round complexity" of the protocol. Sometimes we make a distinction between "on-chain round complexity" and "off-chain round complexity." This distinction is expected to yield a tighter grip on the efficiency of the protocol. The "on-chain round complexity" refers to the number of sequential transactions that need to be made on the blockchain. Since the time taken to confirm a transaction on the blockchain today is about 1 hour, an "on-chain round complexity" of s implies that the protocol will take at least s hours to complete. The "off-chain round complexity" refers to the standard metric of round complexity used in traditional MPC protocols. Note that an off-chain round typically takes less than a few seconds to complete. Thus, we believe that for a fair comparison this distinction needs to be made. Our contributions. We show how to amortize the cost of secure computation with penalties. Let λ be a computational security parameter. Then for = poly(λ) we show how sequential instances of an n-party non-reactive (resp. reactive) secure computation penalties can be realized with the same "on-chain" cost of a single execution in [6] (resp. [15] ). Since the on-chain latency is typically very high and the on-chain costs capture the load on the Bitcoin network, we believe that our results deliver major improvements to the efficiency of secure computation with penalties and make it more easy to envision practical implementations on the Bitcoin network (or other networks). Finally, in our protocols neither the parameter nor the sequence of possibly different functions that need to be evaluated need to be known in advance. (For the reactive case, an upper bound on the transcript and rounds need to be known in advance.) Technical overview and differences from prior work. The main difference from prior work is that we reuse a single initial set of F * CR deposits for multiple instances of secure computation with penalties. That is, parties make an initial set of F * CR deposits first, then locally execute secure computation protocols, and whenever there is an abort in the local execution, they have recourse to the F * CR deposits in order to get penalties. That is, in an optimistic setting where all parties follow the protocol, the initial set of F * CR deposits remain untouched throughout the local executions. In the general case, the initial set of F * CR deposits will be claimed when an abort occurs in one of the local executions.
To make things simple, we divide the implementation of instances into three stages: (1) the master setup and deposit phase, (2.1) a local setup phase for each execution, (2.2) a local exchange phase for each execution, and (3) the master claim phase. In the master setup and deposit phase, parties run an unfair standard secure computation protocol that helps specify the Boolean circuits required for the initial F * CR deposits, following which parties make these F * CR deposits, referred to as the "master deposits." Note that parties do not yet know the inputs of any of the instances of secure computation with penalties and thus all they supply to the master setup phase is simply randomness. Consequently, the Boolean circuits in the F * CR deposits will also be independent of the inputs/outputs of the executions. This is one of the fundamental differences between the previous protocols [6, 15, 16] and ours. For example in the non-reactive protocols of [6, 16] , the Boolean circuits in the F * CR deposits are commitments on the secret shares of the final output. That is, the function evaluation occurs first even before the F * CR deposits are made. On the other hand, in our case, there are multiple function evaluations and the master deposits are made before any of the function evaluations begin. Further, the master deposits will need to allow honest parties to obtain penalties in case any of the function evaluation instances are aborted by the adversary. Our approach can be applied to the setting of [6, 15, 16] by setting = 1. By performing the master deposits before the function evaluation, our approach surprisingly makes the security analysis easier. In particular, we no longer need to worry about aborts that happen during the deposit phase. Even better, all the master deposits can be made simultaneously, i.e., in O(1) on-chain rounds, unlike prior protocols where the deposit phase required O(n) on-chain rounds. Also, in an optimistic setting where all parties behave honestly, the master claim phase (described later) can also be made simultaneously, i.e., in O(1) on-chain rounds.
Once all the master deposits have been made, parties sequentially perform the local executions. At the beginning of each local execution, parties run a secure computation protocol specified in the local setup phase. The objective of this phase is to set things up in a way such that penalties can be obtained from the parties in case of aborts. Following this, parties enter the local exchange phase for that execution, where they exchange messages that reveal the output of that execution. Note that these phases do not involve F * CR . It is only when there is an abort in any of these phases, do parties enter the master claim phase where they try to claim these deposits. We describe the three phases in more detail.
Master setup and deposit phase. In this phase, parties run a secure computation protocol that implements the following functionality: (1) run the key generation algorithm of a signature scheme to generate (mvk, msk), (2) secret share msk among all parties, and output mvk to all parties. We refer to (mvk, msk) as the master keys. Note that msk is unknown to the adversary. Following the secure computation protocol, parties make a series of F * CR deposits. These are the master deposits. The Boolean circuits used in these deposits perform two checks: first, they check for one or more messages each of which contain a signature that verifies against the master verification key mvk, and second, they check that the messages obeys a certain structural relation between them. The structural relation is necessary to ensure that the honest parties obtain penalties if a local execution was aborted. More on this later. Curiously, the sequence of F * CR deposits in the master deposit phase is identical to the "see-saw" deposits of [15] in both the non-reactive and reactive cases. Of course, we will be using different (more complicated) scripts in each F * CR deposit. Local execution phase. In this overview, we will focus only on handling the non-reactive case. In the k-th local setup phase (for k ∈ [ ]), parties run a secure computation protocol that evaluates the function f k on inputs provided by the parties, and then secret shares the output among the parties. The secret shares of the outputs are authenticated twice: once under the msk and once under a local signing key that is generated inside this MPC. Note that to authenticate the output secret shares under msk, the parties will need to provide the secret shares of msk to the MPC. Neither the msk nor the local signing key will be revealed to the parties. Also, the messages that are signed aren't simply output secret shares but will include the execution number k and the identity of the party. That is, if si is the i-th output secret share, then signatures under msk and the local signing key will be computed on the message (i, k, si). Furthermore, the setup phase will also produce signatures under msk on messages of the form (j, i, k) where j, i ∈ [n]. To avoid clutter in our presentation, we assume that the messages These are referred to as the "lock witnesses." Another caveat is that we require that the MPC of the local setup phase to deliver outputs in a particular order. This specific ordering, the use of lock witnesses, and the structure of the messages containing the secret shares all will be important ideas that will ensure that the honest parties get compensated in the event of aborts.
Following the k-th local setup phase, parties enter the k-th local exchange phase in which parties broadcast the output shares along with the authentication under the local signing key to all parties. Again, we will require a specific ordering in which the parties perform broadcasts. If all parties behave honestly, then parties will obtain the output of the k-th local execution, and will proceed to the next execution, and so on. If there was an abort in either the local setup phase or the local exchange phase, parties enter the master claim phase and do not engage in any further local executions. Note that signatures under msk are never revealed during the local executions; they will be revealed only during the claim of the master deposits in the master claim phase.
Master claim phase. In this phase, parties take turns to claim master deposits. The objective of this phase is to ensure that if a local execution was aborted mid-way, then either this local execution is continued to its completion in this phase, or else guarantee that the honest parties obtain penalties. An important attack to defend against is one where the adversary replays messages from an older execution. Such an attack would end up allowing the adversary to claim all the master deposits it is required to claim thereby the adversary does not pay penalties to honest parties. Furthermore, it ensures that the most recent local execution remains aborted and only the adversary learns the output of that execution. Such attacks are taken care of (1) by the use of signatures under the master signing keys that will be revealed only in the master claim phase, and (2) by imposing certain conditions on the structural relations between the messages used in the claim of a master deposit. Claiming a master deposit involves revealing a partial transcript containing, say the first j output secret share messages that are of the form (i, k, * ) for all i ∈ [j] and for some specific value k ∈ [ ].
2 The messages of this form alone are not sufficient to claim the deposit; one has to produce the corresponding signatures under msk as well. By imposing such conditions, namely that j signatures on messages (1, k, * ), . . . , (j, k, * ) are required to claim a deposit, we can ensure that the current local execution is continued. Signatures under msk on messages of the form (i, * , * ) will be revealed by honest Pi for a unique value k (typically the most recent local execution). This in turn will ensure that the k-th local execution is continued in the master claim phase. Of course, if the adversary were to abort in the master claim phase as well, we will show that this would result in all honest parties obtaining the necessary penalty.
Important caveats. Note that the penalties can be obtained only at the end of the master claim phase. The time-limits on the master deposits will typically be high in order to let all the executions finish. Suppose the very first execution was aborted by the adversary. Then the funds of the honest parties will remain locked up until the time-limit on the master deposit expires. We note that for the single instance case, i.e., = 1, more efficient protocols are presented in [16] . Unfortunately, we were not able to take advantage of the techniques in their work. Finally, our protocols can also improve the efficiency of protocols for secure cash distribution with penalties considered in [2, 15] . While our protocols may be used of the form (i, k, si) and (j, i, k) are padded appropriately so that signatures on messages of one form cannot be trivially used to forge signatures on messages of the other form. 2 We often use '*' as the wildcard character.
to implement the protocol part of the construction in [15] , the cash distribution part will require fresh deposits per execution. Still, we believe that the best venues for our results will be in applications such as poker where repeated executions among the same set of parties are likely. Related work. The works of [4, 5] construct 2-party lottery protocols using Bitcoin scripts which essentially implement F * CR . Other notable works which are not in the F * CR model include the works of [2, 1, 13, 12, 14] . The works of [13, 12] use a more powerful transaction functionality which implements a blockchain to implement "smart contracts" and fair secure computation (under the penalties notion). We wish to emphasize that protocols constructed in the F * CR -hybrid model can be easily cast into protocols in any of the above models. Also, we make an explicit distinction between the off-chain costs and the on-chain costs which is not always captured in other works. For instance, in Ethereum, the entire smart contract (or the function) is put on the blockchain, and in a naïve construction, every miner is involved in the computation of the function as well as the state changes associated with executing the contract. These are exactly the type of burdens on the miners that we are trying to relieve via use of (possibly expensive) offchain mechanisms (e.g., secure computation). The works of [21, 8] are concerned with the establishment of a "payment channel" to allows parties to do an unbounded number of money transfers without burdening the blockchain.
PRELIMINARIES
A function µ(·) is negligible in λ if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large λ's it holds that µ(λ) < 1/p(λ). A probability ensemble X = {X(a, λ)} a∈{0,1} * ,n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a and λ ∈ N. Two distribution ensembles X = {X(a, λ)} λ∈N and Y = {Y (a, λ)} λ∈N are said to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every a ∈ {0, 1} * ,
All parties are assumed to run in time polynomial in the security parameter λ. We prove security in the "secure computation with coins" (SCC) model proposed in [6] . Note that the main difference from standard definitions of secure computation [9] is that now the view of Z contains the distribution of coins. Let IDEAL f,S,Z (λ, z) denote the output of environment Z initialized with input z after interacting in the ideal process with ideal process adversary S and (standard or special) ideal functionality G f on security parameter λ. Recall that our protocols will be run in a hybrid model where parties will have access to a (standard or special) ideal functionality Gg. We denote the output of Z after interacting in an execution of π in such a model with A by HYBRID g π,A,Z (λ, z), where z denotes Z's input. We are now ready to define what it means for a protocol to SCC realize a functionality. DEFINITION 1. Let n ∈ N. Let π be a probabilistic polynomialtime n-party protocol and let G f be a probabilistic polynomial-time n-party (standard or special) ideal functionality. We say that π SCC realizes G f with abort in the Gg-hybrid model (where Gg is a standard or a special ideal functionality) if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A attacking π there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S for the ideal model such that for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomialtime adversary Z,
Notation: session identifier sid, an n-input, n -output function f , a hard-coded ordering of outputs χ = (χ 1 , . . . , χ n ), parties P 1 , . . . , Pn, adversary S that corrupts parties {Ps} s∈C , set H = [n] \ C.
INPUT PHASE:
• Wait to receive a message (input, sid, ssid, r, yr) from Pr for all r ∈ H.
• Wait to receive a message (input, sid, ssid, s, {ys} s∈C ) from S.
OUTPUT DELIVERY:
-If S sends (abort, sid, ssid), send (output, sid, ssid, ⊥) to Pr for r ∈ H. DEFINITION 2. Let π be a protocol and f be a multiparty functionality. We say that π securely computes f with penalties if π SCC-realizes the functionality F f according to Definition 1.
Throughout this paper, we deal only with static adversaries and impose no restrictions on the number of parties that can be corrupted. Our schemes also make use of a digital signature scheme which we denote as (SigKeyGen, SigSign, SigVerify).
Ideal Functionalities
Secure function evaluation with ordered output delivery. In our protocols, we ask parties to run secure computation protocols that deliver output in a certain order. (Note that standard secure computation protocols do not guarantee fairness in the presence of a dishonest majority.) Such protocols can be obtained easily by tweaking existing MPC protocols in the following way. First, the function is evaluated on the inputs to produce, say n outputs z1, . . . , zn. Each zi is then secret shared among the parties. Once the outputs are delivered to the parties, they then proceed to reconstruct the actual outputs in order. That is, in the first reconstruction phase, all parties broadcast their shares of z1. At the end of this phase, P1 obtains z1. Then parties broadcast their shares of z2 in the next phase and so on. Our protocols typically involve sending the outputs in reverse order. The actual order is slightly more complicated, but the idea above can be trivially generalized to accommodate our needs. For clarity, we present the generalized definition of the functionality in Figure 1 . The values χj specify the index of the party that is supposed to receive the output in the j-th phase. That is, in phase j, party Pχ j receives the output zj. Note that n > n is possible. In our protocols we will need n = O(n 2 ) but simple round reduction techniques can be applied to implement the desired functionality in O(n) rounds. Note that the protocol realizing F ord f does not guarantee fairness. Also note that F ord f can be realized in the FOT-hybrid model. Claim-or-refund transaction functionality F * CR [6, 5, 19] . At a high level, F CR allows a sender Ps to conditionally send coins(x) to a receiver Pr. The condition is formalized as the revelation of a satisfying assignment (i.e., witness) for a sender-specified circuit φs,r( · ; z) (i.e., relation) that may depend on some public input z. Further, there is a "time" bound, formalized as a round number τ , within which Pr has to act in order to claim the coins. An F CR with session identifier sid, running with parties P 1 , . . . , Pn, a parameter 1 λ , and an ideal adversary S proceeds as follows:
• Deposit phase. Upon receiving the tuple (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, coins(x)) from Ps, record the message (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x) and send it to all parties. Ignore any future deposit messages with the same ssid from Ps to Pr.
• Claim phase.
Until time τ : upon receiving (claim, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x, w) from Pr, check if (1) a tuple (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x) was recorded, and (2) if φs,r(w) = 1.
If both checks pass, send (claim, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x, w) to all parties, send (claim, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, coins(x)) to Pr, and delete the record (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x).
• Refund phase:
After time τ : if the record (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x) was not deleted, then send (refund, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, coins(x)) to Ps, delete record (deposit, sid, ssid, s, r, φs,r, τ, x). important property that we wish to stress is that the satisfying witness is made public by F CR . Any cryptocurrency that supports time-dependent scripts can be used to realize F * CR . Earlier Bitcoin implementations of F * CR were given in [6, 5, 19] , and we provide a more secure implementation in Appendix A. In a Bitcoin realization of F * CR , sending a message with coins(x) corresponds to broadcasting a transaction to the Bitcoin network, and waiting according to some time parameter until there is enough confidence that the transaction will not be reversed. We denote an F CR transaction where sender Ps asks receiver Pr for a witness for a predicate φ in exchange for coins(q) with deadline τ by:
Pr
Next, we define an important metric of protocols that involve a sequence of F * CR deposits called the "script complexity." This metric captures the load on the Bitcoin network for verifying the F * CR transactions.
DEFINITION 3 (SCRIPT COMPLEXITY [14] ). Let Π be a protocol among P1, . . . , Pn in the F * CR -hybrid model. For circuit φ, let |φ| denote its circuit complexity. For a given execution of Π starting from a particular initialization Ω of parties' inputs and random tapes and distribution of coins, let VΠ,Ω denote the sum of all |φ| such that some honest party claimed an F * CR transaction by producing a witness for φ during an execution of Π. Then the script complexity of Π, denoted VΠ, equals maxΩ (VΠ,Ω). ♦ Secure computation with penalties-multiple executions. We now present the functionality F * MSFE which we wish to realize. Recall that secure computation with penalties guarantees the following.
An honest party never has to pay any penalty. If a party aborts after learning the output and does not deliver output to honest parties, then every honest party is compensated. See Figure 3 for a formal description. The main difference between the prior definitions in [6, 15] is that F * MSFE directly realizes multiple invocations of secure computation with penalties. For simplicitly F * MSFE deals only with the non-reactive case. In the first phase referred to as the deposit phase, the functionality F * MSFE accepts safety deposits coins(d) from each honest party Notation: session identifier sid, parties P 1 , . . . , Pn, adversary S that corrupts {Ps} s∈C , safety deposit d, penalty amount q, a time-limit τ , set H = [n] \ C.
DEPOSIT PHASE: Initialize flg = ⊥.
• Wait to get message (setup, sid, ssid, i, coins(d)) from P i for all i ∈ H. Then wait to get message (setup, sid, ssid, coins(hq)) from S where h = |H|.
EXECUTION PHASE: Set flg = 0. For k = 1, . . ., sequentially do:
• Wait to receive a message (input, sid, ssid k, i, x
• Wait until time τ to receive a message (input, sid, ssid k, {x
If no such message was received within time τ , then go to the claim phase.
• Compute (z
• Else if S returns (abort, sid, ssid), update flg = 1, and go to the claim phase.
CLAIM PHASE: At time τ , do:
to P i for all i ∈ H where q i = 0 unless S sent a message (extra, sid, ssid, {q i } i∈H , i∈H coins(q i )). and penalty deposit coins(hq) from the adversary. Note that the penalty deposit suffices to compensate each honest party in the event of an abort. Once the deposits are made, parties enter the next phase referred to as the execution phase where parties can engage in unbounded number of secure function evaluations. In each execution, parties submit inputs and wait to receive outputs. As usual, the ideal adversary S gets to learn the output first and then decide whether to deliver the output to all parties. If S decides to abort, then no further executions are carried out, parties enter the claim phase, and honest parties get coins(d + q), i.e., their safety deposit plus the penalty amount. Note that penalties are distributed only at time τ . Now if S never aborts during a local execution, then the safety deposits are returned back to the honest parties, and S gets back its penalty deposit at time τ .
Note that we require S to deposit coins(hq) up front. This is different from the definition of secure computation with penalties in [6] , where S may not submit coins(hq) and yet the computation might proceed. We believe that our definition is more natural. We are able to support this definition because in our protocol (unlike the case in [6] ), the computation happens only after all the deposits are made. Next, we discuss the reactive case. Reactive case. The definition for the secure computation with penalties in the reactive setting F * MMPC is identical to F * MSFE except that the function f k is composed of sub-functions for the different stages, i.e., f k = (f k,1 , . . . , f k,ρ ), where ρ denotes the number of stages. Now, S can abort between different stages of f k or within a single stage, say f k,ρ . In either case, the honest parties will be compensated via the penalty deposit coins(hq) submitted by S in the deposit phase. For lack of space, the formal definition is presented in the full version.
TWO PARTY NON-REACTIVE CASE
We describe the protocol for the 2-party non-reactive case in Figure 4 . For clarity, we annotate each of the steps in (1) the master deposits as Txj, (2) the k-th local setup phase as sp (k) j , (3) the kth local exchange phase as ex (k) j , (4) the master claims as clmj. Sometimes we treat these annotations as Boolean variables which are set to 1 if the corresponding event occurred or else they are set to 0. As an example, we say "sp
. We now explain the design of the protocol and describe each of the phases in more detail. In the presentation here we ignore some details on the time-limits.
In the master setup phase, parties interact with an unfair ideal functionality that runs the key generation algorithm for a digital signature scheme, and outputs the master verification key mvk to both parties, and secret shares the master signing key msk. In addition, the master function will authenticate the shares of the master signing key. Looking ahead we will need this authentication because each subsequent local execution will need to produce signatures verifiable by the master verification key. To do so, these subsequent local executions will reconstruct the master signing key from the authenticated secret shares held by both parties. Following this, parties enter the master deposit phase where they make F * CR deposits as follows. In the following, τ2 > τ1.
P2
(Tx2)
Here, the predicates φ1, φ2 have the master verification key mvk hardcoded in them. The predicates essentially check if their input is a valid signature against the master verification key mvk. The messages that are signed under msk will be secret shares of the output of a function evaluation (more on this in the next paragraph), and we will append the player index and an execution number denoted id, and then sign the message consisting of player id, nonce, and secret share under the master signing key msk. As we will see below, the predicate φ1 takes as input one message and a corresponding signature, while the predicate φ2 takes as input two messages and corresponding signatures. In addition to checking the validity of the signatures, the predicates also verify an additional condition on the nonces contained in the underlying signed messages. Below, we explicitly specify the predicates φ1 and φ2:
Next, we describe the local setup phase. In the k-th local setup phase, the parties submit their authenticated shares of the master signing key, and further also submit the inputs to an unfair ideal functionality F ord f k computing the function f k that is to be computed in this phase. As described before, the k-th setup phase first reconstructs the master signing key from the authenticated shares submitted by the parties. Then it computes the function f k on the inputs submitted by the parties to obtain the output z (k) . (For simplicity, we assume that all parties obtain the same output.) Following this, the output z (k) is secret shared using an additive secret sharing scheme to produce shares s
2 . Each of these shares is then authenticated twice: once using the reconstructed master sign-MASTER SETUP PHASE: P 1 and P 2 interact with an ideal functionality F f that computes (mvk, msk) ← SigKeyGen(1 λ ) and computes secret shares msk 1 , msk 2 of msk and delivers msk 1 , mvk, MAC(msk 2 ) to P 1 and msk 2 , mvk, MAC(msk 1 ) to P 2 where MAC is (an information-theoretic) message authentication code. MASTER DEPOSIT PHASE: Parties make the following F * CR deposits:
where:
In the k-th local setup phase: Parties agree on the function to be executed f k via broadcast. If there is disagreement, then parties enter the master claim phase. Else, P 1 and P 2 interact with an ideal functionality F ord f k to which they input: (1) the function f k and inputs to f k , and (2) mvk, secret shares of msk, and the corresponding MACs. F ord f k computes the output z (k) obtained by evaluating f k on the inputs provided by the parties, then it secret shares z (k) = s
sends the outputs in the following order (i.e., χ = (2, 1) for F ord
1 ) In the k-th local exchange phase:
(ex
CLAIM PHASE: Parties enter this phase when either all local executions are completed or in the event of aborts after/during the master deposit phase.
1. At time τ 1 : let k denote the last completed local execution. If sp
= 1, then P 1 claims Tx 1 using wit-
), else claim Tx 1 using witness
2. At time τ 2 , if party P 1 claimed Tx 1 using witness (id 1 , t 1 , σ 1 ), then party P 2 claims Tx 2 at time τ 2 using wit-
).
If there exists k such that sp
= 0, then both parties output t 1 ⊕t 2 as the output of the k-th execution.
(clm 2 ) Figure 4 : 2-party realization of F * MSFE ing key msk, and once using a local signing key sk
loc generated inside the unfair ideal functionality. We stress that the local signing key sk (k) loc is never revealed to any party; recall that the global signing key msk is never revealed to any party either. Finally, the local outputs of the unfair ideal functionality in the k-th local setup phase are distributed in the following order to the two parties:
1. Party P2 obtains its secret share of the output s
(sp
2. Party P1 obtains its secret share of the output s
1 ) We will shortly discuss why the order of outputs as above is needed (i.e., why P1 obtains the output of the local setup phase after P2). Observe that to obtain the output of the local phase, parties simply have to exchange the shares s
2. If a valid message was received, then P2 sends T i ) pair sent by party Pi has to be the one generated by the local setup phase, and hence results in parties generating the correct output. Following this, the parties can then proceed to the next local phase and so on. Suppose denote the total number of successfully completed local executions. Once all the local executions are completed, the parties proceed to master claim phase where the following happens in order:
1. At time τ1: let k denote the last completed local execution. If sp
), else claim Tx1 using witness (k, s
2. At time τ2, if party P1 claimed Tx1 using witness (id1, t1, σ1), then party P2 claims Tx2 at time τ2 using witness (id1, t1, σ1, id2 = id1, t2 = s
). If there exists k such that sp
= 0, then both parties output t1⊕t2 as the output of the k-th execution.
(clm2)
The master claim phase is designed in a way that allows the honest party to force the completion of the most recent local execution that is incomplete. For instance, P1 can force the completion of the (k + 1)-th execution by claiming Tx1 using witness
). This then forces P2 to reveal the secret share s (k+1) 2 without which it cannot claim Tx2. This is because the only signature under msk on messages of the form (2, k + 1, * ) that P2 possesses is T (k+1) 2
). Thus, we have that either P2 claims Tx2 or pays a penalty coins(q) to honest P1.
On the other hand, if P1 was dishonest or if all local executions were completed, then parties effectively replay some old execution. That is, P1 will claim Tx1 using witnesses obtained from the k-th local execution for which ex (k) 2 = 1. Following this P2 can claim Tx2 using witness revealed by P1 and witness obtained from the k-th local setup phase. We prove: THEOREM 1. Assume one-way functions exist. There exists a 2-party protocol that SCC-realizes F * MSFE in the (FOT, F * CR )-hybrid model such that the number of calls to F * CR , its script complexity, and deposit amounts are independent of the number of executions.
Proof sketch. Let Pj denote the party corrupted by the adversary A. We describe the simulator S for the protocol of Figure 4 . S begins by acting as the unfair ideal functionality in the master setup phase, and runs the key generation algorithm of a digital signature scheme to produce (mvk, msk). It then chooses a random mskj to give to A. If A aborts the master setup phase, then S outputs whatever A outputs and terminates the simulation. Else, in the master deposit phase, S acts as F * CR . If j = 2, it waits to receive a deposit from A. If the deposit was not received or the deposit is not of the specified format, then S aborts outputting whatever A outputs. Else, S obtains coins(q) from A which it forwards to F * MSFE as the penalty deposit. On the other hand, if j = 1, then S acting as F * CR informs A that (honest) P2 made the deposit as instructed. Then it waits for A to make the deposit. Again if the deposit is not of the correct form or was not made, then S terminates the simulation outputting whatever A outputs. In this case, the simulation is indistinguishable from the real execution since honest P2 would have got coins(q) refunded from Tx2 with all but negligible probability (except in the case A manages to forge signatures under msk). Else, it obtains coins(q) from A which it forwards to F * MSFE as the penalty deposit. This concludes the simulation of the master setup and deposit phases.
In the k-th local setup phase, S learns of the function to be evaluated f k from F * MSFE and acts as the unfair ideal functionality F ord f k , and obtains the input for this execution from A. Note that if A sends incorrect shares of msk, then S terminates the simulation, and the simulation will be indistinguishable from the real execution since the MAC checks won't pass in the real execution except with negligible probability. Then S runs the key generation algorithm of a digital signature scheme to generate (vk
loc ), and computes the signature ψ
loc to A. If A aborts in this step, then S rejects any further local executions and goes directly to the simulation of the master claim phase (described below). This still results in a valid simulation since A should not be able to forge a signature under sk to A. The case when j = 2 is also handled similarly. S first submits the extracted input to F * MSFE to get the output of the k-th local execution z (k) . Then S acting as honest P1 sends the value
to A. It is easy to see that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real execution. Finally, we describe the simulation of the master claim phase. S enters this phase either because there were: (1) aborts in the local setup phase, (2) aborts in the local exchange phase, or (3) all executions were successfully completed. We analyze separately the case when P1 is corrupt and the case when P2 is corrupt. Suppose j = 1. S waits until time τ1 to see if P1 claims Tx1. Suppose P1 does not claim Tx1, then S waits to get its penalty deposit back from F * MSFE and sends it to P1 as refund obtained from Tx2. The simulation is indistinguishable from the real execution because P2 always obtains the output first in the local execution; thus if P1 had received the output of a local execution phase, then so did P2. Therefore, S will be able to get its penalty deposit coins(q) back from F * MSFE . Now on the other hand, suppose P1 did claim Tx1 using some witness (id1, t1, σ1), then S checks if σ (id 1 ) 1 = σ1 (i.e., if σ1 was handed to A during the simulation). The check will pass with all but negligible probability since this corresponds to A forging a signature under msk. In the rest of the analysis we will assume that σ1 = σ
. Now, S acting as F * CR will need to produce coins(q) to A as the claim reward for claiming Tx1. To do so, S will need to obtain its penalty amount from F * MSFE . As before, this step is possible since P1 cannot learn the output of a local execution before the honest party (recall P2 always obtains outputs first in the local exchange phase), and thus S will be able to get its penalty deposit back from F * MSFE which it can send to P1 as the money obtained by claiming Tx1. Now all that S needs to do is to produce witnesses for claiming Tx2 in order to justify that coins(q) from Tx2 are not going to be refunded back to P1. This is easy since the witness (id1, t1, σ1, id2
) satisfies φ2. In other words, the secret shares and corresponding signatures from the id1-th execution will allow honest P2 to claim Tx2. This concludes the simulation in the case when P1 is corrupt. It is easy to see that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real execution.
Next, we consider the case when j = 2. Now S will need to act first (as honest P1) in the master claim phase. Let k denote the number of completed local executions, i.e., ex (k) 2 = 1. If k = 0, then S does not have to act in the master claim phase. It will simply get back its penalty deposit from F * MSFE and return it to P2 as refund of Tx1. The simulation is indistinguishable from real since except with negligible probability P2 will not be able to produce signatures under msk to claim Tx2. In the rest of the simulation, we assume k > 0. At time τ1, S will have to claim Tx1. To do so, S first checks if there was an incomplete local execution, i.e., if sp (k+1) 1 = 1. If there was, this means that the output of the (k + 1)-th execution was not obtained by both parties (in fact, it is possible that only P2 obtained the output and not P1). S will claim Tx1 using the witness (k + 1, s⊕z (k+1) , σ
) where s was the secret share given to P2 as part of the output of the (k + 1)-th local setup phase. Now, S waits to see if P2 claims Tx2. Suppose P2 does not claim Tx2, then this means that in the real execution honest P1 would not obtain the output, but only the penalty. Thus, to make the simulation indistinguishable from real, S will send an abort message to F * MSFE , and terminate the simulation (in particular, it will not get its penalty deposit back from F * MSFE ). On the other hand, if P2 did claim Tx2, then except with negligible probability it has to do using the witness
). This is because the only signature under msk on messages of the form (k + 1, * , * ) that A possesses is on the message (k + 1, s, σ
) obtained during the interaction with S. Thus, in this case, S asks F * MSFE to Note on time-limits: τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τn. deliver the output to P1 for execution k + 1, and obtains back the penalty deposit from F * MSFE which it forwards to P2 as the reward obtained for claiming Tx2. Finally, we consider the case when sp (k+1) 1 = 0, i.e., the (k + 1)-th execution did not deliver outputs to either party. In this case, S gets its penalty deposit coins(q) back from F * MSFE . Then S claims Tx1 using witnesses from the k-th execution, i.e., (k, s⊕z (k) , σ (k) 1 ) where s was the random secret share sent to P2. Now if P2 claims Tx2, except with negligible probability it has to do using witness (k, s⊕z (k) , σ
2 ). Suppose P2 claimed Tx2, then S produces the necessary coins(q) from the returned penalty deposit. On the other hand, if P2 did not claim Tx2, then S sends the returned coins(q) back to F * MSFE to be delivered to the honest party as extra reward. It is easy to see that the simulation is indistinguishable from real both in the standard sense as well as with respect to the distribution of coins. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
MULTIPARTY CASE
We describe the protocol for the multiparty non-reactive case.
MASTER SETUP PHASE AND MASTER DEPOSIT PHASE. In the master setup phase, parties interact with an unfair ideal functionality that realizes the master setup function which runs the key generation algorithm for a digital signature scheme, and outputs the master verification key mvk to all n parties, and secret shares the master signing key msk. In addition, the master function will authenticate the shares of the master signing key. That is, in spirit, the master setup phase is identical to the one in the 2-party case, except now it caters to n parties. Next, parties enter the master deposit phase where they make F * CR deposits as in Figure 5 (i.e., identical to the locked ladder mechanism in [15] ). Note that relation between time-limits is specified in Figure 5 .
Here, the predicates {φi}, {φ unlock j,i }, {φ lock j,i } all have the master verification key mvk hardcoded in them. The predicates essentially check if their input is a valid signature against the master verification key mvk. The messages that are signed under msk will be secret shares of the output of a function evaluation (more on this in the next paragraph), and we will append the player index and a nonce denoted id which essentially denotes an execution number, and then sign the message consisting of player id, nonce, and secret share under the master signing key msk. In addition to checking the validity of the signatures, the predicates also verify an additional structural relation on the nonces contained in the underlying signed messages. Below, we explicitly specify the predicates {φ lock j,i }, {φi}, {φ unlock j,i }:
In the above, we refer to the witness σ as the "lock witness." The description of the predicates use the transcript validator tv which we define below:
is a message of the form (j, idj, * ) and σ
That is, tv
ensures that the witnesses reveal the partial transcript containing the first i message-signature pairs, i.e., (T, σ) pairs. Furthermore the relation between the transcript witness and the lock witness is that the id's contained in them are such that id1 = · · · = idi ≥ id.
LOCAL SETUP PHASE. Next, we describe the local setup phase. In the k-th local setup phase, the parties submit their authenticated shares of the master signing key, and further also submit the inputs to an unfair ideal functionality F ord f k computing the function f k . The k-th local setup phase first reconstructs the master signing key from the authenticated shares submitted by the parties. Then it computes the function f k on the inputs submitted by the parties to obtain the output z (k) . Following this, the output z (k) is secret shared using an additive secret sharing scheme to produce shares s
n . Each of these shares is then authenticated twice: once using the reconstructed master signing key msk, and once using a fresh local signing key sk (k) loc generated inside F f k . In addition signatures under msk are generated on messages (j, i, k) for all i, j ∈ [n] × [n] such that j ≥ i. We stress that the local signing key sk (k) loc is never revealed to any party; recall that the global signing key msk is never revealed to any party either. Finally, the local outputs of the unfair ideal functionality in the k-th local setup phase are distributed in the following order to the parties: (sp
Observe that the witnesses delivered by F ord f k are in the reverse order of the witnesses that are required to claim the master deposits. Later in the local exchange phase, these witnesses will be exchanged among the parties in the reverse order in which they were distributed in the setup phase. LOCAL EXCHANGE PHASE. To obtain the output of the local phase, parties simply have to exchange the shares {s (k) i }, and the output of the local phase equals i s
The local exchange phase happens in the following order:
, then all parties terminate the k-th local phase, do not participate in any further local executions, and enter the master claim phase.
After this, the local phase completes, and the parties have obtained the outputs. Note that since signatures under sk
loc are unforgeable except with negligible probability (because each party only has an additive share of sk (k) loc ), it follows except with negligible probability that a valid (T
i ) pair sent by party Pi has to be the one generated by the local setup phase, and hence results in parties generating the correct output. Following this, the parties can then proceed to the next local phase and so on. Alternatively, if some party did not send a valid message, then the honest parties would simply terminate the local executions and enter the master claim phase. An important note is that it may be the case that at this point the adversary already knows the output, therefore in these cases, we have to ensure that the honest party is compensated. This will be handled in the master claim phase. MASTER CLAIM PHASE. From the discussion above, it is clear that parties may enter the master claim phase if there was an abort that happened during one of the earlier phases. We will handle all these cases in our description of the master claim phase. Let k denote the most recent completed execution, i.e., ex (k) n = 1. It is possible that the (k +1)-th execution was never started (either there was an abort or the parties unanimously agreed to terminate all local executions), or there was an abort in the middle which means sp (k+1) i = 1 or even ex (k+1) i = 1 for some i. Note however that ex (k+1) n = 0 must hold (otherwise (k + 1)-th execution was also completed). We describe the master claim phase for each Pi. (clmi)
where k is the maximum value such that sp This concludes the description of the master claim phase. We present a series of propositions which will be useful to prove that our protocol realizes F * MSFE . Detailed proofs of the propositions are available in the full version. In the following, we assume that k denotes the most recent completed execution, i.e., ex
PROPOSITION 2. Honest parties never lose money during the claim phase. That is, for every honest Pi:
1. If Txi−1 was claimed, then Pi will be able to claim Txi. Proof sketch. The main argument is that the local setup phase releases witnesses in a way such that if Txi−1 can be claimed then so can Txi. This is because Step sp There exists a unique k ≤ k + 1 such that for each i ∈ H (i.e., Pi is honest), the only signatures under msk on messages of the form (i, k , * ) that are revealed to adversary are for k = k .
If Tx
Proof sketch. The main argument is that the lexicographically first honest party, say Pi will reveal only one signature under msk on messages of the form (i, * , * ). That is there will be a unique k for which Pi will release only one signature under msk on a message of the form (i, k , * ). Denote this message-signature pair as (Ti, σi). Actually, (Ti, σi) = (T i . Clearly, (Ti, σi) is released when Pi claims Txi. Let TTi be the witness used to claim Txi. The master claim is designed in a way such that TTi along with a lock witness is used to claim Tx unlock j,i (see Steps (2b) and (3a)). Now given that honest Pi releases signatures under msk only on Ti, it follows that any valid partial transcript TT i released by honest party P i to claim Tx i or Tx unlock j,i or Tx lock i ,j for j > i will necessarily have (Ti, σi) ∈ TT i . Thus, for TT i to be a valid partial transcript, it must hold that (T i , σ i ) ∈ TT i must be such that T i = (i , k , * ). This completes the proof. , party P1 must produce TT1 which contains main witness (1, k +1, * ), i.e., corresponding to the (k + 1)-th execution. It no such main witness is released, then it follows that honest parties claim penalty coins(q) from P1. (In this case, by Proposition 2 we have that honest parties don't lose money elsewhere, so they end up with penalty coins(q).) The remainder of the proof follows by an induction argument on each Pj (with the base proved above for j = 1) for the statement exactly as in the proposition. We note that for the general case, honest parties whose index is less than j would have claimed penalty coins(q) from the coins((j − 1)q) deposited in Txj−1, and the honest parties whose index is above j would have claimed penalty coins(q) from the lock deposits Tx lock i,j . Note that the proposition implies that if the adversary gets the output of the (k + 1)-th execution, then either honest parties also obtain the output or they obtain a penalty. PROPOSITION 5. Suppose there was an abort in the (k + 1)-th local setup phase. Then, the adversary obtains the output of the (k + 1)-th execution only if (1) the honest parties also obtained the output of (k + 1)-th execution, or (2) all honest parties obtained a penalty.
Proof sketch. Suppose sp (k+1) 1 = 0. Then we argue that no party gets the output of the (k +1)-th execution. This is because no party obtains the first secret share of the output. Then by Proposition 2 we have that honest parties don't lose money, and this suffices for security. On the other hand if sp (k+1) 1 = 1, then it is possible that the adversary obtains the output of the (k + 1)-th execution. Note that since an abort happened in the (k + 1)-th local setup phase, it follows that the honest parties would not have broadcasted any messages in the (k + 1)-th local exchange phase. Thus, for the adversary to get output, it needs honest parties to reveal the main witnesses corresponding to the (k + 1)-th execution during the master claim phase. By Proposition 3, it follows that the adversary must ensure that the first honest party, say Pi reveals the main witness corresponding to the (k + 1)-th execution (even though the adversary might have obtained this witness from the (k + 1)-th local exchange phase). Then, by an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 4 and starting the base case of the induction from index i + 1 we have that either the (k + 1)-th local execution was completed or all honest parties obtained a penalty. On the other hand, if the first honest party does not produce a main witness corresponding to the (k + 1)-th execution, then the adversary will not obtain the output of the (k + 1)-th execution. In this case, invoking Proposition 2 is sufficient to ensure security. We defer the proof of the following theorem to the full version. THEOREM 6. Assume one-way functions exist. There exists a protocol that SCC-realizes F * MSFE in the (FOT, F * CR )-hybrid model s.t. the number of calls to F * CR and its script complexity are independent of the number of executions.
The Reactive Case
Due to space limitations, we only provide a short sketch of our protocol. More details are avaiable in the full version. We will follow the idea used in [15] to realize secure computation of reactive functionalities with penalties. At a high level, the idea is to let the parties run an MPC protocol π for the underlying reactive functionality, and have the predicates in the F * CR transactions check the validity of the partial protocol transcript. That is, let an n-party m-message protocol π be defined by pairs of algorithms {nmf j , tv j } j∈ [n] . Here tv j is the transcript validator function that takes a transcript of the protocol up to the j-th message, and outputs 1 iff it is a valid transcript of π . The algorithm nmf j is the next message function that takes a valid partial transcript TT j−1 (i.e., tv j−1 (TT j−1 ) = 1), party P j mod n 's input x j mod n and its private randomness, say ω j mod n , and produces the j-th message µ j of the protocol signed under P j mod n 's public key. We define the j-th partial transcript TT j = TT j−1 µ j . Protocol transformation. As in [15] , we will transform a n-party m-message protocol π = {nmf j , tv j } j∈ [m] into an equivalent nmessage m-message protocol π = { nmfj, tvj} j∈ [m] where the protocol messages contain layers of signatures. That is, each party signs each message it sends, so messages contain layers of signatures. Also, parties do not accept messages which do not have correct signatures. Our construction. Surprisingly, our construction for the reactive case is very similar to the protocol for the non-reactive case. In fact, the master setup phase and the master deposit phase is identical. That is, the sequence of deposits is the same as the locked ladder mechanism presented in Figure 5 . As it turns out, the predicate descriptions are also identical as in the non-reactive case, of course with the important difference that now tv will also need to include the transcript validator of the MPC protocol realizing the reactive functionality. Thus, our predicates are:
The transcript validator tv defined below, now depends on π = { nmfj, tvj} j∈[m] :
-for all j ≤ i: Tj is a message of the form (j, idj, * ) and σj is a valid signature on Tj under msk
We use TT to denote concatenation of five-tuples (µj, idj, ψj, Tj, σj) and TT to denote concatenation of threetuples (µj, idj, ψj). tv, tv are the respective transcript validators of TT, TT. We give details on the rest of the protocol. At a high level, all of the phases are very similar to the non-reactive case except for the use of additional witnesses (µ i , id, ψi) which essentially correspond to the actual MPC execution of the reactive functionality. Specifically, the main new argument to prove security will be the unforgeability of the signature ψi for honest Pi on the message (µ i , id) and that in a witness TTj used by corrupt Pj, the id's in TTj must be consistent with T (id) i for honest Pi (the unique id under which honest parties release signatures under msk) which in turn forces µ i , id, ψi used as part of TTj to be exactly as the ones released by Pi. As in the non-reactive case, we will be able to prove that the id corresponds to an incomplete local execution if there is one.
LOCAL SETUP PHASE. In the k-th local setup phase parties submit the authenticated secret shares of the master signing key as input to an unfair ideal functionality F ord f k that delivers outputs in the following order:
For i = n down to 1: Observe that this phase is identical to the non-reactive case except now the values s . Note that we will be using the protocol obtained as a result of transformation procedure described above. Party P1 starts by running nmf Upon receiving µ (k) j−1 from party P j−1 mod n , party P j mod n with input x (k) j mod n and randomness ω (ex
MASTER CLAIM PHASE. Denote by k the most recent completed execution, i.e., ex (k) n = 1. It is possible that the (k + 1)-th execution was never started (either there was an abort or the parties unanimously agreed to terminate all local executions), or there was an abort in the middle which means sp }j>i We describe the master claim phase for Pi:
1 Claim Txi using witness TTi and save the value TTi to use in the next step. using TTi (from the previous step), k , σj,i where ( * , k , σj,i) was the witness used to claim Tx lock j,i . This concludes the description of the master claim phase and of the protocol. Please see the full version for the formal description and the security proof.
CONCLUSIONS
We made a distinction between "on-chain" complexity (verification complexity imposed on miners) and "off-chain" complexity (that is borne by the protocol participants). In this paper we showed how to amortize the "on-chain"cost of secure computation with penalties. Several important questions remain. Could we reduce the "on-chain" complexity of a single execution? Alternatively, can we derive the amortization result for the reactive case using only O(nr) initial deposits? Also, can we improve the practicality of our schemes by possibly removing the need to do the signature generation/verification part inside the MPC?
